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Executive summary 
About this review 
This document is a review of the draft Seabed Minerals Bill 2019 (Cook Islands). The Bill was made available 
for public consultation in December 2018. The Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining (CSRM) is 
undertaking this review, on a voluntary basis, at the invitation of the Seabed Minerals Authority. This review 
applies CSRM’s multi-disciplinary expertise of the global mining sector. Observations are provided in the 
spirit of respect and collaboration, in the hope that they will assist minerals governance in the Cook Islands. 
Scope and approach 
Only the Bill is reviewed. The draft Seabed Minerals Policy and draft Seabed Minerals Sector Strategy are 
referred to in framing the review, but are not themselves part of the review. The review also excludes Part 8A 
of the Bill (‘Seabed Mining in the International Seabed Area’).   
The review is guided by four principles: clarity and coherence of the Bill; transparency and accountability; 
environmental protection; and civic participation. These principles were derived from the draft Policy and 
draft Sector Strategy. 
Key findings and recommendations 
The draft Bill sets outs a generally coherent framework for the management of seabed minerals in the Cook 
Islands. It provides a sound basis for further iterations of the Bill. This review identified 20 opportunities to 
strengthen the design of the Bill. Six major points include:  
• Clarity and coherence: The practical difference between prospecting and exploration is unclear. Using 
the descriptor ‘low-impact’ to define prospecting presupposes knowledge of the impacts of prospecting 
activities – yet the Policy states that ‘lack of data about the deep seabed … makes it difficult to assess’ 
the impact of seabed mineral activities. 
• Transparency and accountability (1): The Bill sets out no criteria for granting an exploration or mining 
licence. The ‘qualification criteria’ only determine whether a company can be considered for a licence. 
No criteria are provided in the Bill for deciding whether a company should be granted a licence. The Bill 
should hold the decision-maker accountable against specific criteria.  
• Transparency and accountability (2): Cabinet must approve the Minister’s decision to grant an 
exploration or mining licence. It is unclear whether the Cabinet or the Minister holds ultimate decision-
making power. In the interests of accountability, the true decision-maker should be identified. 
• Environmental protection: The Bill amends the Environment Act. Practically, these amendments could 
allow Cabinet to exempt seabed mining from environmental impact assessment and environmental 
approvals. The amendments create a loophole that should be closed, in order to improve accountability 
and better align the Bill with the Policy objective of ‘sustainable environmental management’. 
• Civic participation: Mechanisms for public consultation before the grant (or refusal) of a licence can be 
strengthened. The Bill does not specify what information the public is entitled to receive, nor require the 
Authority to actively solicit public feedback. Enhancing the degree of public participation will help 
achieve the Policy objective of ‘engagement and cooperation between communities and government’. 
• Other: Search, entry, and inspection powers granted to inspectors are extremely broad. While they 
mirror comparable NZ statutes, they do not incorporate accountability safeguards present in the NZ 
statutes. Constructing safeguards against misuse of power would strengthen the Bill. 
A summary table of all 20 findings and recommendations appear at the conclusion of this review. CSRM 
welcomes follow-up engagement.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 About this review 
This is an independent review of the draft Seabed Minerals Bill 2019 (Cook Islands) (‘the Bill’). The Bill was 
made available for public comment by the Seabed Minerals Authority (‘the Authority’), alongside the following 
draft documents: 
• Explanatory note to the Bill 
• Seabed Minerals Policy3 
• Seabed Minerals Sector Strategy / Sector Plan,4 and 
• Part 8A of the Bill (‘Seabed Mining in the International Seabed Area’).5  
These documents were released for public review on 22 December 2018,6 except for Part 8A of the Bill, 
which was issued separately on 23 January 2019. The deadline for public comment was initially set for 
6 February. The deadline was extended until 27 February, and later extended again to 14 March.7  
The Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining (CSRM) is undertaking this review at the invitation of the 
Authority. CSRM acknowledges the Authority’s statement that ‘these documents are still under review and 
are subject to more amendments’.8 This review is provided in the spirit of respect and collaboration, and in 
the hope that it will contribute positively to minerals governance in the Cook Islands. The review was 
undertaken on a wholly voluntary basis. 
1.2 What does this review cover? 
This document reviews the Bill only. The draft Seabed Minerals Policy and Sector Strategy informed the 
review, but neither is assessed here. The review also excludes Part 8A of the Bill, which is operationally 
separate from the other parts of the Bill. 
The review assesses the Bill against four key principles:  
• Clarity and coherence  
• Transparency and accountability 
• Environmental protection, and 
• Civic participation. 
These principles were drawn from the Seabed Minerals Policy and Sector Strategy. Guiding questions 
corresponding to each of these principles are presented in Table 1 (overleaf). Additional observations not 
falling directly under these four principles are also offered. 
                                                     
3  Version 2 (draft date: 3 January 2019). 
4  The Seabed Minerals Authority website refers to this document as a ‘Plan’ (last accessed 24 February 2019). The document itself is 
entitled ‘Seabed Minerals Sector Strategy’ (draft 14.1.19, dated February 2019). 
5  Part 8A appears intended to be part of the Seabed Minerals Bill. It was released on the Authority’s website separately from, and at a 
later date than, the rest of the Bill. Consequently, this review treats Part 8A as a separate document.   
6  The version of the Bill reviewed herein was issued for public comment on this date. 
7  An earlier version of this review was submitted to the Authority on 27 February. This version (20 March) incorporates minor editorial 
amendments and additional information in footnotes. 
8  Seabed Minerals Authority (Undated). ‘Draft Documents’. Online at https://www.seabedmineralsauthority.gov.ck/seabed-
minerals/documents_idl=10003_idt=514_id=2730_.html. Accessed 13 February 2019. 
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Table 1: Principles and guiding questions for this review 
Principles Guiding questions 
Clarity and 
coherence 
• Is the Bill coherent on its own internal logic?  
• Does it make sense in the context of seabed mining in the Cook Islands? 
Transparency and 
accountability 
• Does the Bill allow the public to access decision-makers’ reasoning?  
• Are decision-makers required to account for their decisions? 
• Does the Bill allow for corruption risks? 9 
Environmental 
protection 
• Does the Bill adequately provide for the assessment and management of 
environmental risk and impacts? 
Civic participation • Does the Bill allow for public participation in decisions about seabed mining? 
• Is such participation meaningful? 
The objective of this review is to raise key issues for the Authority (and other stakeholders) to consider in 
further drafting and consultation rounds. This review does not comment on every provision of the Bill; an 
absence of commentary in relation to a provision does not imply endorsement of that provision. Additionally, 
this review does not set out to cover: 
• How the Bill interacts with other Acts and policies within the Cook Islands10 
• The legislative history of the Bill and the current Seabed Minerals Act 2009 
• Legislative regimes in other jurisdictions 
• Seabed mining developments in other jurisdictions, or 
• The advisability of seabed mining in the Cook Islands or elsewhere, from a policy perspective. 
CSRM welcomes follow-up engagement on any aspect of this review. 
1.3 Structure of this review 
This review is structured according to the four principles identified above. Section 2 addresses clarity and 
coherence in relation to how seabed mineral activities are defined. Section 3 assesses transparency and 
accountability in the approvals process (i.e. processes for the grant of permits and licences). Environmental 
protection is assessed in section 4, and section 5 addresses civic participation. Section 6 provides 
additional observations. Section 7 summarises key findings and provides recommendations. 
2. Clarity and coherence: seabed mineral activities 
2.1 Definitions under the Bill 
Part 4 of the Bill establishes three types of titles: prospecting permits, exploration licences, and mining 
licences.11 Prospecting permits are regulated under Part 4, Subpart 2, while exploration and mining licenses 
are regulated together under Subpart 3.12 
                                                     
9  This review does not suggest actual corruption has occurred. ‘Corruption risk’ refers to the potential for people to ‘abuse … 
entrusted power for private gain’. See: Caripis, L. (2017) ‘Combatting corruption in mining approvals’. Report written for 
Transparency International. Online at http://transparency.org.au/tia/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/M4SD_CombattingCorruption.pdf.  
10  Except insofar as the Bill proposes to amend the Environment Act. 
11  Retention leases are not a title under the Bill (cf. Seabed Minerals Act 2009), but clause 63 of the Bill provides for rights of retention. 
12  The heading to Part 4, Subpart 3 is ‘Licensing of seabed mineral activities…’. This heading is imprecise. As defined in clause 6, 
‘seabed mineral activities’ includes prospecting, but Subpart 3 only relates to exploration and mining. 
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Clause 6 defines mining, exploration, and prospecting. Mining is conceptualised as commercial extraction of 
seabed minerals, and the construction and operation of associated infrastructure (‘mining, processing, and 
transportation systems'). 
Exploration includes:  
• Searching for seabed minerals in a title area 
• Sampling and analysing those minerals 
• Testing systems and equipment, and 
• Carrying out studies. 
Exploration ‘does not include mining’ – that is, commercial extraction is not exploration.  
Prospecting means ‘low-impact activities involved in the preliminary search for seabed minerals deposits, 
including estimation of the composition, size, and distribution of deposits and their economic values, without 
exclusive rights’.  
2.2 Distinction between exploration and prospecting 
The Bill does not make clear what practically distinguishes prospecting and exploration. In mining 
terminology, prospecting and exploration are ‘widely considered synonymous’, but sometimes prospecting 
refers to ‘the initial, more primitive phase of exploration’, which ‘can help locate sites that … may result in an 
ore deposit discovery’.13 
For example, the Mining Act 1992 (PNG) treats prospecting and exploration synonymously. Exploration is a 
‘manner or method of prospecting for the purpose of locating and evaluating mineral deposits’. By contrast, 
in Queensland, Australia, the Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld) treats prospecting as type of exploration. 
Prospecting is taking ‘action to find out about the existence, quality or quantity of minerals on, in or under 
land’ by using handheld instruments only.14 Exploration includes prospecting, and also extraction and 
removal of material for testing, using instruments ‘appropriate to determine the existence of any mineral’.15 
In New Zealand, the Crown Minerals Act 1991 (NZ) considers prospecting and exploration as different 
activities. Prospecting is ‘any activity undertaken for the purpose of identifying land likely to contain mineral 
deposits or occurrences’ (emphasis added), and includes a range of surveying and sampling methods. 
Exploration is undertaken to identify mineral deposits, and includes drilling, dredging and excavations. 
The Seabed Minerals Bill appears to distinguish between prospecting and exploration, because it provides 
separate titles for each type of activity. But the Bill provides little guidance on what constitutes prospecting as 
distinct from exploration. Clause 44(c) provides the only real distinction: prospecting does not include drilling, 
the use of explosives, or the introduction of harmful substances into the marine environment. Impliedly, 
exploration could involve these activities, but not necessarily. 
Could level of impact distinguish prospecting from exploration under the Bill? Prospecting is defined as ‘low-
impact activities’ (similar to the approach taken by New Zealand); exploration could involve activities of 
greater impact. The Bill, however, provides no mechanism for determining the level of impact before an 
applicant applies for a prospecting permit or exploration licence. An environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
under the Environment Act 2003 might be an apt mechanism, but clause 71 suggests that an EIA would be 
undertaken after the applicant has decided between an exploration licence or prospecting permit. The EIA 
process starts too late for distinguishing prospecting from exploration on the basis of impact. 
                                                     
13   Lee-Moreno, Jose L. (2011) ‘Minerals Prospecting and Exploration’ (Chapter 3.2). In: Peter Darling (ed), SME Mining Engineering 
Handbook (3rd edition). Englewood, Colorado: Society for Mining, Metallurgy, and Exploration. 
14  Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld), s 6B. 
15  Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld), schedule 2. 
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Incorporating ‘low-impact’ in the definition of prospecting may be operable for terrestrial mining, where 
prospecting methods are well established. By contrast, deep-sea mining would be novel for the Cook 
Islands. The draft Seabed Minerals Policy acknowledges that ‘the lack of data about the deep seabed and its 
associated ecosystems presently makes it difficult to assess fully the potential impact of SBM Activities 
[seabed mineral activities]’.16 Prospecting presupposes a low level of impact, when the basis for assessing 
the impact of prospecting activities is not rigorously established. 
As a matter of clarity and coherence, the practical distinction between prospecting and exploration should be 
spelt out. Applicants would need to know which title would best fit the activities in mind. Mechanisms for 
determining ‘low-impact’ (for prospecting permits) should be set out in the Bill, rather than presupposed. 
3. Transparency and accountability: approvals process 
3.1 Clarifying decision-making for the granting of licences 
The Bill establishes a five-step process for the grant (or refusal) of an exploration or mining licence (Table 2). 
It requires the Authority’s recommendation, plus Cabinet approval, before the Minister can issue a licence. 
Table 2: Steps in grant of licence (paraphrased) 




After the applicant has met the qualification criteria, the Authority ‘evaluate[s] 
the application against the prescribed evaluation criteria’: clause 50(2). The 
Authority then makes a recommendation to the Minister. 
2 Minister’s intent The Minister must decide whether he or she intends to follow the Authority’s 
recommendation: implied in clauses 55(2) and 56(1). 
3 Authority provides 
draft licence 
If the Minister intends to grant the licence, then the Authority must provide a 
draft licence to the applicant: clause 56. The Minister must approve this draft 
before it is given to the applicant. 
4 Cabinet approval Cabinet must provide ‘its prior approval to the licence terms, in accordance 
with the recommendation of the responsible Minister’, and may request advice 
from the Crown Law Office before it provides such approval: clause 57.17  
5 Minister grants 
licence 
The Minister may grant the licence once Cabinet has provided approval: 
clause 55(3). 
By requiring Cabinet to endorse the Minister’s decision, these steps seem to establish an extra layer of 
accountability. However, it is not clear what oversight Cabinet really has under the Bill, and consequently the 
Bill does not compellingly improve accountability. Specifically, it is not clear whether the Cabinet has power 
to challenge the Minister’s decision. Clause 57(1) says that the Minister makes a ‘recommendation’ to the 
Cabinet, suggesting that the Minister is providing advice, not making decisions. If the true decision-making 
power lies with the Cabinet, the Bill should say so.  
Conversely, clause 57(1) also states that Cabinet approval is ‘in accordance with’ the Minister’s 
recommendation. If the Cabinet’s approval must accord with the Minister’s view, then Cabinet approval is 
merely procedural. Cabinet approval does not add additional legislative accountability that can be enforced 
                                                     
16  Investigations to-date, including those by the Pacific Community (SPC) and the Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation 
(JOGMEC), may obviate the need for further prospecting. See generally SPC-EU Deep Sea Minerals Project 
(http://dsm.gsd.spc.int), and Okamoto, N. (2015) 'Deep-Sea Mineral Potential in the South Pacific Region'. Journal of MMIJ: Journal 
of the Mining and Materials Processing Institute of Japan 131: 597-601. 
17  Because Cabinet is approving licence terms developed by the Authority, Step 4 must follow Step 3; they cannot be concurrent. In 
clause 55(3), the phrase, ‘and after the Authority has complied with section 56’, is unnecessary. The remainder of clause 55(3) is 
also unnecessary, because clause 57(1) already makes Cabinet approval a precondition to the Minister’s decision. 
 Review of the draft Seabed Minerals Bill 2019 (Cook Islands) 
Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining – Sustainable Minerals Institute 9 
 
in a court (although there may be political accountability because the Minister needs to convince the Cabinet 
to approve the decision). The Cabinet’s power to consult the Crown Law Office does not add accountability, 
because the Bill does not empower Cabinet to do anything with that advice.18  
Overall, who truly decides to grant a licence is not clear. Principles of accountability require the decision-
maker to be clearly identified before the decision-maker can be held to account. The Bill should: 
• State whether it is the Minister or the Cabinet who makes the decision (cf. a mere recommendation). 
• State the basis on which a decision is to be made (see 3.2, Articulating the basis for granting licences). 
• Clarify who may supersede another’s decision, and whose input is merely advisory or procedural.  
Finally, from an applicant’s perspective, the Bill does not allow the applicant to discuss or negotiate the 
licence terms drafted by the Authority in Step 3. Such a negotiation is likely to happen in practice – but not as 
part of a legislative process. The absence of a formal negotiation mechanism makes ‘out of process’ 
decisions likely, creating a corruption risk. 
3.2 Articulating the basis for granting licences 
The Bill does not set criteria for granting exploration and/or mining licences. Clauses 51 and 52 provide 
‘qualification criteria for the grant of a licence’, but these criteria are threshold tests, the satisfaction of which 
make the applicant eligible to be considered. The criteria do not necessarily inform a final decision to grant or 
refuse a licence. Clause 50 makes it clear that the qualification criteria form a threshold test only, because 
the Authority must evaluate the application only after the qualification criteria are met.19  
Clause 50(2) says that, ‘[i]f the applicant meets the qualification criteria, the Authority must evaluate the 
application against the prescribed evaluation criteria’. No such evaluation criteria are prescribed in the Bill. 
The word ‘prescribed’ might refer to regulations made pursuant to clause 113. However, clause 113 is 
permissive, not prescriptive (‘The Queen’s Representative may … make regulations…’; emphasis added). 
There is no guarantee that the evaluation criteria would be developed at all.20 
The absence of clear criteria is an issue of accountability. The Minister should be obliged to state how he or 
she weighed each and every criterion to arrive at the decision.21 To enhance accountability, the criteria 
should be set out in the Bill itself – rather than in regulations – because the Bill requires Parliamentary 
approval (as do amendments to Acts), whereas regulations do not. 
Having evaluation criteria in legislation also allows courts to review the Minister’s decision against the 
criteria. Not having legislative criteria means that judicial accountability mechanisms are difficult to harness; 
only political accountability would likely be viable.  
                                                     
18  Additionally, the Cabinet, the Minister, and the Authority as a statutory agency can already refer matters to the Crown Law Office. 
Clause 57(2) appears only to duplicate an existing power. It does not add an accountability mechanism. 
19  See clauses 50(1) and (2) of the Bill. 
20  It is understood that new, forthcoming regulations will specify evaluation criteria. Draft regulations were not available for public 
comment at the time of the review. 
21  Clause 58 requires the Minister to publish reasons for a decision, but does not require the Minister to address specific criteria. 
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3.3 The Authority decides prospecting permits 
The Authority grants prospecting permits.22 The Authority is a statutory agency established by legislation.23 It 
is not clear from the Bill why it is the Authority, and not the responsible Minister, who decides whether to 
grant prospecting permits.24 As an elected official, the responsible Minister would be accountable to a 
greater range of checks and balances than the Authority.  
3.4 Articulating the basis for granting permits 
The basis for granting prospecting permits is unclear. Clause 40 requires that a permit application: ‘(a) 
complies with the prescribed requirements; and (b) satisfies the prescribed criteria’. No such criteria are 
presented in the Bill; nor does the Bill require such prescriptions to be made. Clause 42 provides criteria for 
denying a prospecting permit. Positive reasons to grant a permit are not provided in the Bill. 
4. Environmental protection 
The management of environmental risks and impacts is likely to receive intense public scrutiny. It has been 
discussed in the news media,25 and in recent academic literature.26 The draft Seabed Minerals Policy states 
that seabed mining is ‘a frontier industry’ and that there ‘are many unknowns and legitimate concerns that 
need to be addressed’ for seabed mining ‘to progress in a sustainably responsible and effective manner’. 
Environmental protection is a ‘critical priority’.27 The Policy states that a ‘lack of data … may compromise 
effective environmental management’. The draft Sector Strategy states that exploration activities ‘are 
considered to have low environmental impact’,28 and while ‘mineral exploitation’ has ‘been studied 
extensively’, there remain ‘varying views and perspectives of the degree to which seabed mineral activities 
will impact the environment’. 
4.1 Interaction with Environment Act 
Clause 74 of the Bill states that the Environment Act 2003 applies, and that no right to prospect, explore, or 
mine is conferred until Environment Act requirements are met. These include the requirement of an 
environmental impact assessment, pursuant to section 36 of the Environment Act.29  
The Bill amends the Environment Act.30 Section 36 of the Environment Act would be replaced with new 
sections 36, 36A, 36B, and 36C. Section 20 of the Environment Act would be replaced with a new section 20 
and section 20A. The amendments are detailed in Schedule 1 of the Bill. 
                                                     
22  Clause 40 of the Bill. 
23  Clause 10 of the Bill. 
24  The reason may be that prospecting involves less disruptive activities than exploration and mining – but note the difficulty of 
presupposing that prospecting would be ‘low-impact’:  see 2.2, Distinction between exploration and prospecting. As noted above in 
footnote 16, in practice, some applicants may proceed directly to exploration without further prospecting. 
25  E.g. Cook Islands News. 2019. ‘Fear over seabed minerals law’. February 10. Accessed 24 February 2019. Online at: 
http://www.cookislandsnews.com/national/environment/item/71983-fear-over-seabed-minerals-law.  
26  E.g. Aguon, J. and Hunter, J. (2019) ‘Second Wave Due Diligence: The case for incorporating free, prior, and informed consent into 
the deep-sea mining regulatory regime’. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 38(1): 3-55; Filer, C. and Gabriel, J. (2018) ‘How could 
Nautilus Minerals get a social licence to operate the world's ﬁrst deep sea mine?’ Marine Policy 95: 394-400. 
27  To be precise: The Policy states that consistency with ‘the primary purpose of the Marae Moana Act 2017’ is ‘a critical priority’. The 
Marae Moana Act’s primary purpose ‘is to protect and conserve the ecological, biodiversity, and heritage values of the Cook Islands 
marine environment’: section 3(1).  
28  The Strategy goes on to say, ‘See List attached’, but no list demonstrating low environmental impact appears to be included. 
29  See also clause 7(2)(g) of the Bill.  
30  Clause 114 of the Bill. 
 Review of the draft Seabed Minerals Bill 2019 (Cook Islands) 
Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining – Sustainable Minerals Institute 11 
 
4.2 Cabinet could exempt seabed mining from Environment Act 
The current section 36 of the Environment Act is entitled, ‘Environmental impact assessment’ (EIA). Mostly, 
the proposed sections 36 to 36C reproduce the existing section 36 with an improved structure. The proposed 
section 36(7)(b), however, would be new – and highly problematic. It weakens accountability for decision-
making under the Environment Act. Table 3 extracts the relevant provisions for discussion below. 
Table 3: Proposed amendment to Environment Act 2003 – EIA provisions 
Sub-s Text as amended 
36 Environmental impact assessment 
(1) No person may undertake any activity which causes or is likely to cause significant 
environmental impacts except in accordance with a project permit issued under this section. 
(7) 
 
For the purposes of subsection (1) … 
(b) regulations may declare any kind or class of seabed minerals activity to be or not to be an 
activity which causes or is likely to cause significant environment impacts. 
The regulations referred to in section 36(7)(b) would mean regulations developed by the Executive Council,31 
which comprises the Queen’s Representative and Cabinet.32 Because the Queen’s Representative acts on 
the advice of the Cabinet,33 this provision would effectively allow the Cabinet to exempt from environmental 
permitting any seabed mineral activity, including any activity relating to prospecting, exploration, or mining. 
This provision is concerning, because: 
• No limit to power: The Cabinet could suspend the need for environmental impact assessment for any 
or all seabed mineral activities. 
• No transparency: The Cabinet need not provide reasons for exempting seabed mining from 
environmental impact assessment. 
• No scientific basis required: No input from any advisory group is required for the Cabinet to declare 
seabed mining as unlikely to cause significant environmental impacts – despite the draft Seabed 
Minerals Policy acknowledging that ‘the lack of data about the deep seabed and its associated 
ecosystems presently makes it difficult to assess fully the potential impact of’ seabed mineral activities. 
In other words, while the Bill establishes the Environment Act 2003 as prevailing over the Bill,34 it also 
changes the Environment Act potentially to allow seabed mining to proceed without the need for 
environmental impact assessment.35 This amendment to section 36 of the Environment Act runs the risk of 
circumventing existing regulatory measures designed to ensure environmental protection in seabed mining.36 
                                                     
31  Section 70 of the Environment Act confers power to make regulations. 
32  Article 22 of the Constitution of the Cook Islands provides for the composition of the Executive Council. 
33  Article 5 of the Constitution: ‘The Queen's Representative … shall act on the advice of Cabinet, the Prime Minister, or the 
appropriate Minister as the case may be’. 
34  Clause 8 of the Bill. 
35  It is anticipated that forthcoming regulations will provide greater clarity on what is to be exempt from EIA. However, these 
regulations have not been released for public comment, and do not form part of this review. 
36  No actual intention to circumvent the Environment Act is imputed. The main point is that there is a risk of circumvention created by 
the wide powers conferred to the Cabinet by the Bill, which should be avoided or minimised. 
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4.3 Removal of Council members for public dissent 
The Bill proposes a new section 20 and section 20A for the Environment Act, which together address the 
composition and function of the National Environment Council. Under these changes, the Minister and 
Cabinet retain the power to remove Council members who, in dissenting with the majority of the Council, 
‘publicly criticises the decision of the majority’. This power is currently provided by section 20(3) of the 
Environment Act – if amended by the Bill, the provision would be section 20A(1)(b). 
Transparency would be better achieved if the Bill removed this power. The role of the National Environment 
Council is to provide advice to decision-makers, utilising Council members’ knowledge of governance and 
environmental risk management.37 The ability to remove Council members for public dissent could: 
• Prevent the public from learning the expert opinions provided in Council, and 
• Discourage otherwise qualified and expert individuals from participating in the Council, thereby denying 
the Cook Islands government the benefit of such expertise. 
4.4 ‘Serious harm to the environment’ as basis for refusing licence 
The Authority ‘must not grant a prospecting permit if’ the permit would be likely to ‘cause serious harm to the 
marine environment’.38 There is no analogous provision for exploration and mining licences.  
Clause 54 of the Bill does say that a licence must not be granted if it would lead to ‘a contravention of … the 
Marae Moana Act 2017’, or otherwise ‘is not demonstrably in the national interest’. This clause imports a 
degree of environmental protection, but it only provides a general reference to national interest and the 
Marae Moana Act. Confidence in the Bill’s ability to protect the environment would be strengthened if the 
Minister had explicit and specific power to refuse a licence on the grounds of environmental protection.  
Note that a licence may be varied, suspended, or cancelled if ‘scientific knowledge or best environmental 
practice’ rendered seabed mineral activities unacceptably risky or not in the public interest.39 This power 
does not extend to a refusal of a licence in the first place.  
4.5 Whether government must apply precautionary approach and 
best environmental practice  
Entities holding prospecting permits, exploration licences, and/or mining licences must adhere to the 
‘precautionary approach’ and ‘best environmental practice’.40 Clause 6 defines the precautionary approach; 
‘best environmental practice’ is not defined. 
It is unclear whether the Cook Islands government must also follow these principles. Clause 7(2) obliges ‘a 
person or body, while exercising their right to utilise the marine resources in the exclusive economic zone or 
relevant areas, to … (e) apply the precautionary approach; and (f) employ best environmental practice’. It is 
unclear whether the italicised text (emphasis added) includes the Cook Islands government.41 Environmental 
protection would be strengthened if relevant bodies of the Cook Islands government were explicitly obliged to 
apply the precautionary approach and best environmental practice. 
The Authority is specifically obliged to act in accordance with clause 7(2).42 
                                                     
37  The proposed section 20(5) of the Environment Act establishes the required ‘knowledge and experience’ of Council members. 
38  Clause 42(1)(c)(ii) of the Bill. 
39  Clause 101(1)(d)(ii) of the Bill. 
40  Clause 76 of the Bill, referring to Schedule 2 (‘General duties of title holders’). 
41  Clause 6(1) defines ‘person’ as natural and legal persons, while ‘body corporate’ means companies. The Crown is not included. 
42  Clause 12(a)(ii) of the Bill sets out the duties of the Authority. 
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5. Civic participation 
This section of the review considers whether and to what extent the Bill reflects objectives relating to civic 
participation. The draft Seabed Minerals Policy has among its objectives: 
• 1.2 – ‘We will ensure issuing of licences have clear transparent processes, accessible and able to be 
understood by the public’. 
• 2.1 – ‘We will take all reasonable steps to ensure that the administration of SBM Activities [seabed 
mining activities] is conducted in participation and consultation with other relevant Government agencies 
and the Cook Islands community’. 
The draft Sector Strategy similarly declares an intention to consult broadly: ‘The Cook Islands, and thus 
every person in the Cook Islands, owns and is entitled to be involved in decision‐making regarding the 
country’s oceanic resources, so genuine and effective engagement is critical.’ Public engagement is ‘a sign 
of a healthy participatory democracy’, and necessary to maintain ‘sufficient “social licence” to operate, 
meaning that there is sufficient majority public and political support to see the project through to completion’. 
The Bill sets up mechanisms for informing the public and receiving public feedback, but clearer obligations 
for the Authority and Minister are needed to give practical effect to the intent of the Bill with respect to civic 
participation. The following sections elaborate on this observation. 
5.1 The public’s entitlement to be informed of licence applications 
Clause 53 of the Bill is entitled ‘Licence decision-making: consultation’. Upon receiving a qualifying 
application for a mining or exploration licence, the Authority is to inform (a) other States and Crown 
agencies, and (b) the Cook Islands public, about that application. 
Other States and Crown agencies are to be provided ‘appropriately comprehensive information’ about the 
application. What constitutes ‘appropriately comprehensive’ is not defined, but States and Crown agencies 
presumably have their own channels for obtaining the information they need. 
The public is not entitled to ‘appropriately comprehensive information’. The Authority is only obliged to ‘notify 
the application to the public of the Cook Islands in accordance with the prescribed procedures or otherwise 
as the Authority considers appropriate’. This wording is problematic for several reasons:  
• What information must be publicised is not defined. The phrase ‘notify the application to the public’ 
provides scant guidance. 
• No procedures are ‘prescribed’ in the Bill. Draft regulations have not been put forward for consultation. 
• The Authority may unilaterally override any procedures that may be prescribed in future, by virtue of the 
phrase, ‘or otherwise as the Authority considers appropriate’. While it is not uncommon for statutory 
agencies to have discretionary powers, there are often explicit and extensive conditions to the exercise 
of such power.  
A more transparent mechanism for informing the public would: 
• Specify in the Bill what information must be given to the public. 
• Specify the channels through the information must be published (e.g. gazette, newspaper, website). 
• Either remove the power of the Authority to circumvent procedures without oversight, or make the power 
subject to explicit and transparent conditions, so that it is invoked transparently and only as a final 
option in consideration of national interests. 
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5.2 Active versus passive mechanisms for public feedback 
The Bill does not require the Authority or the Minister to actively invite public participation. The Authority must 
only ‘consider any information in relation to that application that is provided … in response to a notice or 
notification under this’ clause.43 In other words, the Bill creates a passive consultation mechanism.  
As a comparative example, in Papua New Guinea, the Mining Act 1992 (PNG) requires the Minister to 
convene a ‘development forum’ to hear the views of people affected by the mine. This review does not 
suggest that the PNG system be adopted for the Cook Islands – it is offered as an example of active 
consultation entrenched in legislation. 
Without an active consultation mechanism, the breadth of feedback received is unlikely to represent broad 
public support. It would be difficult to argue that a project has a ‘social licence to operate’44 if only a small 
cross-section of the Cook Islands public has been engaged with. The degree of participation set up by the 
Bill is not yet sufficient to meet the participatory objectives declared in the draft Sector Policy and Sector 
Strategy. The Bill would achieve better public participation if: 
• The Authority were required to actively seek public opinion, and 
• Such requirements were likely to cover a representative cross-section of the Cook Islands population. 
5.3 Minimum periods for public feedback on licence applications 
The Bill does not require any minimum period for which public feedback can be submitted.45 An oblique 
reference to such a period appears in clause 53(1)(c): the Authority must consider ‘information … that is 
provided, within a time period that is specified’. Since no time period is specified in the Bill, the ‘prescribed 
procedures’ in paragraph (b) would apply (if any exist); the Authority can also specify any period it ‘considers 
appropriate’. Members of the public require time to: read and understand the information provided; reflect on 
their response and seek advice; and prepare considered feedback. Robust public participation would involve 
providing adequate time to comment, and being clear from the outset how much time is available.46  
The Bill could strengthen public participation by: 
• Setting clear timeframes for public feedback, and 
• Ensuring timeframes are adequate for considered responses. 
Because seabed mining is an emerging sector, the Authority may consider establishing timeframes for public 
participation that exceed those typically allowed for terrestrial mining. 
5.4 Risk of suppression  
The above observations can be combined to illustrate a scenario of suppression of public participation. 
Under clause 53, the Authority could disclose very scant detail about an application to the public, because it 
can unilaterally decide what disclosure is ‘appropriate’ and override any prescribed procedures. The 
Authority could subsequently decline to invite feedback from the public. Some members of the public would 
probably still write to the Authority, but the feedback received would not be well informed, nor representative 
of the Cook Islands public. Public feedback could be limited to a very short period, making it difficult to 
prepare detailed responses. Finally, the Authority could also refuse to publish feedback received from the 
                                                     
43  Clause 53(1)(c) of the Bill. 
44  Seabed Minerals Sector Strategy (draft 14.1.19), p. 61. 
45  Clause 53 of the Bill. 
46  For example, under the Mining Act 1992 (PNG), any person can object to the grant of a ‘tenement’, and the period for submitting 
such an objection is ‘not less than 30 days after the date on which the application was registered’: sections 105 and 107. Again, this 
review does not endorse the PNG system for the Cook Islands; the example is offered for comparative purposes only. 
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public, giving the impression that there has been no dissent to a licence application. None of this conduct 
would contravene the consultation mechanism set out in the Bill. 
This scenario is not to suggest that the Authority intends to suppress public feedback. But transparent and 
accountable governance would require the Bill to construct protections against the risk of suppression. 
Setting out minimum requirements in legislation would be a key step in ensuring transparency and 
accountability. These requirements would include those suggested in the preceding three sections of this 
review. Additionally, the Bill could require the Authority to publish the feedback it has received, within a 
certain deadline – this transparency mechanism would allow public inspection of others’ feedback. 
5.5 Standing to seek review of licence decision 
Applicants and ‘any other interested party with legal standing’ may ask the Minister to review the decision to 
grant or refuse a licence.47 The Minister must either affirm or amend the ‘recommendation’ to the Cabinet 
‘within the prescribed time of receiving the request’. Judicial review is retained as an alternative avenue of 
redress outside the Bill. 
This provision creates a mechanism whereby the Minister can be asked to reconsider a decision or 
recommendation, but ultimately make the same decision again. This mechanism is not unusual. The clause 
can be improved by describing who has legal standing, and setting a clear timeframe for a review application 
to be made (‘the prescribed time’ is not clear because no such prescription appears in this Bill). 
5.6 Free, prior, and informed consent  
The general duties of title holders are set out in Schedule 2.48 Title holders ‘must obtain free, prior, and 
informed consent [FPIC], including by way of compensation’ from ‘marine or coastal users likely to be 
adversely affected by … seabed mineral activities’. What rights are conferred by this provision is unclear. If 
compensation is to be paid, then a process for deciding compensation should be set out. Leaving the basis 
of compensation undefined creates a corruption risk (e.g. bribery). 
What degree of social acceptance constitutes FPIC is not defined. The consequences of not securing FPIC 
is not addressed. For example, how much dissent is sufficient to prevent a title holder from commencing 
seabed mineral activities? FPIC is a good principle to strive for, but as a legislative duty it requires careful 
consideration and further detail. 
6. Additional observations 
6.1 Powers to enter, search, and inspect vessels  
Part 7 of the Bill authorises inspectors to enter and search vessels, installations, vehicles, and premises. The 
scope of these powers is extremely wide, and the power is triggered with few checks and balances. A title 
holder can seek administrative review of an inspector’s actions, but only to determine whether the inspector 
acted outside the scope of authority – it is the scope of authority that is problematic in the first place. 
The Bill appears modelled on New Zealand laws.49 The powers from these New Zealand laws have been 
imported into the Bill, but none of the safeguards against abuse of power. In particular, the Search and 
Surveillance Act 2012 (NZ) requires search warrants in most instances.50 The Bill does not mention search 
warrants or other accountability measures. 
                                                     
47  Clause 59 of the Bill. 
48  See also clause 74 of the Bill. Title holders are entities holding a prospecting permit, or an exploration or mining licence: clause 6(1). 
49  The Bill cites the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 (NZ) and Fisheries Act 1996 (NZ). 
50  See Search and Surveillance Act 2012 (NZ) Part 4, Subpart 3. 
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6.2 Seabed minerals regulations and other Acts of Parliament 
The Seabed Minerals Bill (or Act, if passed), would prevail over other Acts.51 Clause 6(2) of the Bill says: 
‘unless the context otherwise requires, a reference to this Act includes a reference to regulations made 
under this Act’. The effect could be to make seabed minerals regulations (which do not pass Parliament) 
prevail over Acts of Parliament. This inverts the orthodox hierarchy of legislative instruments. It is unclear 
whether this inversion is intended. 
6.3 Repeated use of ‘prescribed’ 
The word ‘prescribed’ is used frequently in the Bill (nearly 60 times). ‘Prescribed’ means ‘prescribed by 
regulations under this Act or another Act’.52 Regulations making such prescriptions are not yet available for 
public comment; consequently, consultation draft of the Bill is missing some important detail. In future 
iterations of the Bill, clarity would be improved by specifying which regulations (and which specific provisions 
within the regulations) are referred to when the word ‘prescribed’ is used. 
6.4 Who exercises the power of the Authority? 
The Authority holds principal responsibility for administering seabed minerals development. The Authority is 
tasked with making many decisions and taking multiple actions. Accountability can be sharpened by 
specifying who (which officer) can exercise which decisions. Clearly, the Commissioner would exercise the 
Authority’s power – what about other staff? 
6.5 Minor drafting errors 
Several minor drafting errors are raised to provide assistance to the Authority: 
• Cross-referencing errors: The version of the Bill released for public consultation contains cross-
referencing errors. For example, clause 89 of the Bill refers to ‘search powers conferred by … 
section 82 or 83’, which relate to payments. The actual reference should be ‘section 87 or 88’. There are 
multiple similar cross-referencing errors.  
• Director of NES as chair: Schedule 1 of the Bill sets out proposed amendments to the Environment 
Act. The proposed section 20(3)(a) of the Environment Act says that the Director is ‘chairperson of the 
Authority’. Is ‘Authority’ a mistake? ‘Council’ seems to make more sense – it would be a reference to the 
National Environment Council. 
• Who appoints members of the NEC? In Schedule 1 of the Bill – the proposed section 20(4)(a) says 
that the Director appoints members to the National Environment Council, while section 20(3)(b) says 
that the Cabinet makes such appointments. There is an inconsistency there. 
                                                     
51  Except for the Constitution, the Environment Act 2003 and the Marae Moana Act 2017: see clause 8(2). 
52  Clause 6(1) of the Bill. 
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7. Summary of findings and recommendations 
Overall, the review finds that the Bill is broadly coherent, and has set up a clear framework for the next round 
of drafting. Further consideration and drafting will ensure that the Bill better reflects the objectives of the 
Seabed Minerals Policy and Sector Plan. Table 4 summarises the key findings of the review, and provides 
recommendations for addressing them. 




Clarity and coherence: seabed mineral activities 
2.2 The distinction between prospecting 
activities and exploration activities is 
unclear in the context of seabed mining (cf. 
terrestrial mining). 
The use of the term ‘low-impact’ to define 
‘prospecting’ is unhelpful in a frontier 
industry like seabed mining, because the 
Bill provides no mechanism for determining 
impact before an applicant applies for a 
prospecting permit or exploration licence. 
Clearly state what activities constitute 
prospecting and exploration.  
Ensure that activities are described, rather 
than the presupposed impact of those 
activities. 
Transparency and accountability: approvals process 
3.1 It is not clear whether it is the Minister or 
the Cabinet who grants an exploration or a 
mining licence. Accountability would be 
improved by clearly stating who is the 
decision-maker. 
The licencing process does not formally 
allow an applicant to negotiate the draft 
licence terms issued by the Authority. Such 
negotiation is likely to be conducted outside 
the regulation of the Bill. Transparency 
would be improved if the Bill provided a 
clear process for such negotiation. 
If the Minister is the decision-maker, then 
Cabinet’s role needs to be clarified to 
indicate that its approval is procedural only. 
Clause 57(1) should be amended so that the 
Minister is presenting a ‘decision’, not a 
‘recommendation’ to Cabinet. 
If the Cabinet is the true decision-maker, 
then clauses 55 to 57 should be amended to 
make this design clear. 
Insert into clause 55 or 56 a process for 
applicants to discuss the draft terms of 
licence before submission for Cabinet 
approval. 
3.2 The Bill sets out no criteria that the Minister 
must consider when deciding to grant (or 
refuse) a licence application. The 
qualification criteria only determine 
eligibility to be considered, not whether a 
licence should be granted. Accountability 
would be improved by ensuring that the 
Minister answers to legislative criteria 
enshrined in the Bill. 
In clause 55, provide a set of criteria that the 
Minister must consider when deciding 
whether to grant a licence.  
The criteria would also be applied by the 
Authority, in deciding whether to recommend 
granting a licence. 
A similar set of criteria could be created for 
Cabinet’s approval in clause 57. 
3.3 The Authority (not the Minister) decides 
prospecting permits. As an elected official, 
the Minister is subject to more checks and 
balances than the Authority. 
In clause 40, consider making the Minister 
responsible for granting (or refusing to grant) 
prospecting permit applications. For 
transparency, the Authority would submit and 
publish a recommendation to the Minister. 
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3.4 The Bill sets out no criteria for granting a 
prospecting permit. Only ‘prescribed 
requirements’ and ‘prescribed criteria’ are 
mentioned. No such prescriptions are 
available at the time of this review.  
As a matter of accountability, ensure that 
clause 40 sets out clear bases for granting 
prospecting permits.  
Note: clause 42 already sets out bases for 
denying prospecting permits. 
Environmental protection 
4.2 In amending the Environment Act, the Bill 
would, in effect, grant Cabinet powers to 
exempt any or all seabed mineral activities 
from environmental impact assessment. 
Environmental protections should not be 
easily circumvented by executive action.  
In Schedule 1 of the Bill, remove the 
proposed section 36(7)(b) as it relates to the 
Environment Act. 
4.3 The Environment Act allows members of 
the National Environment Council to be 
removed for publicly voicing their dissent of 
a Council decision. This power reduces 
transparency and robustness of debate. 
In Schedule 1 of the Bill, remove the 
proposed section 20A(1)(b) as it relates to 
the Environment Act. 
4.4 Criteria for granting an exploration or 
mining licence are not set out in the Bill 
(see 3.2 in this review). Decision-makers 
are not explicitly called to consider 
environmental impacts, or given a clear 
mandate to use serious environmental 
harm as a reason for refusing a licence.  
In clause 54 or 55 of the Bill, include 
environmental impacts as a criterion that the 
Minister must consider when deciding 
whether to grant or refuse a licence. 
4.5 It is unclear whether the Cook Islands 
government must apply the precautionary 
approach and best environmental practice. 
Note: clause 12 of the Bill requires the 
Authority to apply these principles. 
Clarify in clause 7 of the Bill that the Minister 
and the Cabinet are to apply the 
precautionary approach and best 
environmental practice in administering the 
Bill and its regulations.  
Civic participation 
5.1 The public is entitled to be notified of a 
licence application, but the Bill does not 
specify what information must be published, 
nor what procedures must be followed. The 
Authority has unilateral power to override 
any procedures for notifying the public, as 
long as it considers it ‘appropriate’. While 
such discretionary powers are not unusual, 
they are usually accompanied by conditions 
that make them exercisable only in certain 
circumstances. Public reasons for 
exercising them are often required. 
Accountability requires the public to be 
informed. Procedures for public disclosure 
should be comprehensive and protected in 
the Bill (cf. regulations). 
Remove clause 53(1)(b) as written. In its 
place, specify:  
• What information the public is entitled to 
receive about applications for licences, 
and 
• The channels through the information 
must be published. 
In particular, either remove the power of the 
Authority to decide unilaterally what 
information the public should receive, or 
make it subject to extensive conditions for (a) 
triggering the power in limited circumstances; 
and (b) ensuring transparency in the exercise 
of that power. 
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5.2 The Bill does not oblige the Authority to 
actively seek public feedback on licence 
applications. Consequently, feedback may 
come only from a narrow cross-section of 
the public. Participatory democracy would 
be enhanced by processes requiring active 
solicitation of public feedback. 
Insert new provisions (in or around cl 53) that 
require the Authority to actively seek public 
feedback (e.g. by way of consultation 
workshops), and to ensure that feedback is 
truly representative of the Cook Islands 
people. 
5.3 The Bill does not provide a minimum period 
during which feedback from the public must 
be kept open. 
Insert a minimum time period for public 
feedback, in or around clause 53. As a 
frontier industry, and in light of global scrutiny 
on seabed mining in general, consider 
making timeframes for consultation longer 
than typical consultation for terrestrial mining. 
5.4 Taking the observations in 5.1 to 5.3 above, 
there is a risk that the Authority could 
suppress public input prior to the grant of a 
licence. While no actual suppression is 
alleged, accountability in the Bill could be 
strengthened to reduce this risk. 
See above three rows. In addition, insert a 
provision in or around clause 53, requiring 
the Authority to publish feedback received. 
Publication of such feedback should be done 
in a timely manner, so that the public can 
read others’ feedback to inform their own 
views before a licencing decision is made. 
5.5 Clause 59 of the Bill empowers parties ‘with 
legal standing’ to seek review of the 
Minister’s decision with respect to licensing. 
Who has standing is not defined, and as 
written depends on external principles of 
administrative law. 
For clarity, describe who has legal standing 
in clause 59, and specify the deadline within 
which a review is to be sought. 
5.6 Title holders must obtain free, prior, and 
informed consent (FPIC) before starting 
seabed mineral activities: schedule 2. The 
Bill is not clear as to what constitutes FPIC, 
and what degree of dissent is enough to 
prevent seabed mineral activities. 
Paying compensation is described as part 
of obtaining FPIC. The Bill does not specify 
the basis of determining and paying 
compensation – this creates a bribery risk.  
The Bill should clarify what is meant by FPIC, 
and set out a comprehensive scheme for the 
calculation, negotiation, and payment of 
compensation. Implementing this 
recommendation will require substantial new 
provisions.  
Additional observations 
6.1 Powers to enter, search, and inspect 
vessels, premises, etc. are extremely 
broad. The provisions in this Bill appear to 
be imported from NZ statutes, but without 
the same checks and balances (e.g. the 
requirement for search warrants). There is 
a risk of abuse of power. 
Rewrite the powers in Part 7 of the Bill, 
and/or insert accountability measures similar 
to those found in the NZ statutes cited in the 
Bill – e.g. Search and Surveillance Act 2012 
(NZ). 
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6.2 It is not clear whether seabed minerals 
regulations would prevail over other Acts of 
Parliament (except the Environment Act 
and the Marae Moana Act). If so, then the 
orthodox legislative hierarchy (with Acts 
prevailing over regulations) would be 
inverted. 
Clarify in clauses 8(c) and (d) whether 
seabed minerals regulations are intended to 
prevail over Acts of Parliament. 
6.3 The word ‘prescribed’ is used frequently, 
but few prescriptions appear in the 
documents issued for consultation. 
Consequently, the consultation draft of the 
Bill is missing important detail. 
Ensure that regulations are also put forward 
for public consultation, alongside the next 
iteration of the Bill. 
6.4 Accountability would be sharpened if the 
Bill clarified which officers (other than the 
Commissioner) can exercise the power of 
the Authority. 
Clarify who can exercise the power of the 
Authority. A blanket rule could be inserted in 
clause 21 (Head and staff of Authority), or 
else specified throughout the Bill. 
6.5 Minor drafting errors are noted for the 
Authority’s convenience. 
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